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1. The livestock sub-sector of the Nigerian economy has an important role to play in
the overall development of the country. Not only does the sub-sector provide the
much needed animal protein for the ever growing Nigerian population, it also offers
employment opportunities for millions of rural and urban dwellers involved in some
form of livestock production and marketing.
2. There is a dearth of information about Nigeria's livestock population and herd
structure. However, estimates made consist of between 12-16 million cattle, about
13.5 million sheep, some 26 million goats, about 2.2 million pigs and 150 poultry
(local and exotic breeds). Regrettably, the size and diversity of Nigeria's livestock
resource has not been able to provide the minimum animal protein requirement of
the average citizen. Many reasons have been advanced for the low capacity of local
livestock species to meet domestic requirements. These range from the producers'
alleged "social psychological enclave" to institutional and policy factors.
5. The problem of locally produced animals and animal products manifested at the
time of independence and worsened through the post-independence years. The
shortage of meat and other animal products had to be supported by imports. By
1976, the situation was such that the value of food and live animals imported into
the country overtook thai of exports (Table l). As local supplies dwindled,
increasingly huge amounts of foreign exchange continued to be allocated for the
procurement of meat and other livestock products. Collosal import bills were being
incurred by both the federal and state governments by the early 1980s. By 1983,
for instance, Nigeria recorded an import bill of about Nl 121 million for food and
live animals alone1. ln 1984, a total of 549 768 heads of cattle was imported into
the country (Federal livestock Department, 1984:27). This figure represents about
43% of the total recorded supply in the country and was valued at N429.4 million
(at an annual average price of N781 per head) at that time. And of the total
available cattle in the country in 1984, recorded movement to the southern states
stood at almost 72% - an indication that livestock production and marketing is
geared towards meeting the needs of urban dwellers.
4. It became increasingly obvious that the bulk of Nigeria's food requirements will have
to be met through local production. This is more so because of the slim and
dwindling financial resources available to the government to support imports of
livestock products.
5. It was necessary, therefore, to put in motion all the machinery required to support
and sustain the indigenous livestock base.
6. This thinking led to the establishment of the Shika Stock Farm (now the National
Animal Production Research Institute) in 1928. The farm was mandated to produce
male stock that would be distributed to farmers, research and develop pasture and
range management, and animal health delivery and other aspects of livestock
production, research, development and extension.
Advent of Smallholder Fattening Scheme
7. The concern of the government about the little success recorded in improving the
traditional systems of livestock production of the numerous pastoralists probably
prompted the government to divert attention to other non-pastoral producing groups.
Thus, in the second half of the 1970s (under an arrangement with the World Bank)
the Nigerian government embarked upon a livestock development project, (the First
Livestock Development Project - FLDP), with the World Bank providing about
50% of the funds required. The main objective of the project was to enhance the
production of beef and the provision of animal-source protein to the Nigerian public.
This was within the framework of the national objective of increasing the low
offtake rates. The project was to engage in designing effective but non-sophisticated
methods of beef cattle production that included fattening as well as
developmentand management of commercial ranches (Federal Government of
Nigeria, 1984).
8. The thrust of the FLDP derived from a strong desire to commercialize livestock
production throughout the country. This is being done by gradually de-emphasizing
projects and programmes aimed directly at the traditional pastoralists who own and
manage about 90% of Nigeria's cattle population and shifting government livestock
development efforts towards involving non-conventional livestock producers (anyone
interested in fattening cattle and is able to provide some amount of seed capital).
9. Among some of the specific projects embarked upon were the Smallholder Fattening
Scheme (SHFS), ranching and livestock enterprises (corporate and private), mixed
farming, grazing reserve development and settlement schemes. Of all these projects
under the First Livestock Development Project, the Smallholder Fattening Scheme
was considered by the project executor to be the most successful. Success was
measured by the level of enthusiasm shown by project beneficiaries, the volume of
loan disbursed as well as the loan recovery record (which was considered to be over
85%), requests from commercial banks to participate in the scheme, the number of
animals fattened and the weight gain of animals fattened2. The FLDP and in
particular the SHFS was considered such a huge success that a decision was reached
by the Nigerian government to replicate it under the Second Livestock
Development Project (SLDP). This was despite the observations made to the effect
that the SHFS made no more than a tiny dent in correcting the meat deficits in the
country (Awogbade, 1985 and Craig, 1982).
10. The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the performance of the Smallholder
Fattening Scheme under the Second Livestock Development Project in the light of
the set objectives of the scheme. The ultimate goal is to determine the impact of
the scheme on aggregate meat supply and its profitability from the point of view of
the participants. This is done by using available project data generated by the
coordinating agency.
The Second Livestock Development Project (SLDP) and the SHFS
1 1. The SLDP was premised (like the FLDP) on the need to provide high quality animal
protein in desirable quantities to the Nigerian public. One of the aims of the
SLDP is to improve the quality and weight of cattle at slaughter through the
establishment of smallholder cattle fattening credit scheme made available in
different parts of the country.
12. Fattening ruminant livestock is an old practice especially among agro-pastoralists.
It is a system of livestock production which aims at raising livestock for the market.
The purpose has always been to feed livestock intensively for a limited period so
as to attain desirable slaughter weight and make some profit from the process.
Animals involved usually include cattle and sheep (mainly in the savanna region)
and goats. The fattening of pigs has recently become an important activity in many
parts of the sub-humid and humid zones. The fattening operation usually relies on
the use of farm and household wastes such as the residues of maize, sorghum and
millet. Others include groundnut, cowpea and soyabean haulm. Recently, the use
of agro-industrial by-products has become important feed sources for fattening
livestock. The most commonly used of these agro-industrial by-products are
brewers spent grains (BSG) which are frequently dumped by the numerous
breweries across the country. Brewers spent grains are believed to have high crude
protein content and can be used as a main feed source for fattening livestock if
supplemented with other energy source feeds.
13. Fattening schemes are intended by the executing agencies to raise the supply of
meat substantially and at the same time provide additional income for participating
beneficiaries. The organizational and technical components of the SHFS have been
described by Craig (1982). This paper evaluates the socio-economic impact of the
scheme vis-a-vis its stated objectives.
Assessing the SHFS
14. The decision to replicate and expand the scheme from its first phase to the second
was apparently informed by the assessment of the performance of the scheme in
particular and the FLDP in general. The basis that evaluators of the scheme used
for giving the SHFS (under the FLDP) a "pass mark" still remains largely unclear.
15. Using the aggregate recovery rate (of loans disbursed to beneficiaries) as one of the
major criteria to justify its replication to an expanded phase seems very curious and
unrealistic, in view of the incredibly high costs incurred by the implementing
agencies in the procurement of supplementary feeds and minerals, veterinary drugs,
and making same available to the beneficiaries at highly subsidised rates. Also, the
cost of man-hour labour inputs of the farmers as well as those of the executing
agencies are all part of the uncomputed costs that went into the scheme.
16. These "hidden costs" ought to have been accounted for in making a proper
assessment of the performance of the scheme. Without this, only a partial, and
rather blurred picture of the whole story can be drawn. Furthermore, the lack of
complete returns/records from many states makes it difficult to offer an accurate
account of the scheme let alone to claim with certainty that it has been very
successful. For instance, in the final report (Project Completion Report) on the
scheme, incomplete data were recorded for at least seven of the nineteen states
covered by the scheme (see NLPD, 1988:6). In addition, the reported high loan
recovery rate may (urn out to be not as impressive as it seems if complete records
were to be considered in the final computations. The seemingly impressive low loan
default rate becomes hard to substantiate when states are considered individually.
17. Using available data (NLPDs 1988), our computed default rate for the states that
made complete returns ranged between 3.5% for Bendel State and 82.3% for Niger
State (Table 2). Taking a look at the aggregate net default, it can be observed that
the default rate for the ten states considered was as high as 51.4%. This
immediately raises some doubt about the expressed performance of the scheme as
contained in the Project Completion Report. In that report, it was observed that the
default rate was insignificant. Observations based on Table 2 do not bear this out.
18. Furthermore, if each state is considered individually, it would be seen that some
states performed relatively worse than others in terms of loan repayment. The case
of Bendel State with a loan recovery rate of 94.5% can be contrasted with Niger
State with a loan recovery rate of only 17.7%. A variety of factors may be
associated with the varying level of loan recovery from beneficiaries. Such factors
may include unanticipated costs incurred by the farmers in the process of fattening
livestock, their management abilities, sale price of fattened animals, and so on.
19. The above observations focus only on one of the grounds on which the SHFS under
the FLDP was judged a complete success. Other aspects that have not been
considered enough include the economics of the scheme measured in terms of
weight gains and profit margins resulting from the fattening operation. It has been
observed that "the average rates of live weight gain are low" (Craig, 1982:386). By
implication, the profit margins of the farmers can be considered to be very low as
well. This is especially so where the sale of animals in open markets is hardly
based on weight. Often, the physical appearance and conformity of the animal to
certain traditional values are the determinants of the sale price.
20. Many SHFS participants have indeed been unable to break-even at the end of the
fattening period. Making a similar observation regarding the lack of economic
wisdom in projects like the SHFS, McLeroy and Salahu (1971) remarked thai
farmers were unable to fetch a premium for their cattle and therefore lost money
in the process. A similar trend can be observed with the SHFS under the Second
Livestock Development Project.
21. In Table 3 the liveweight gain is assessed along with the market value of the animals
after fattening, based on the returns made by the participating states. While
average weight gain was about 78 kg over the 60-90 day period, there is considerable
variation between states. For example, Sokoto State recorded a mean weight gain
of 20 kg while Kaduna State had the highest weight gain of 125 kg. Using the
average weight, liveweight gain of about 0.86 kg is achieved under the scheme for
all the states pulled together.
22. It may be observed that the recorded mean daily liveweight gain per animal was
quite high. This is especially so when liveweight gains achieved under the SHFS
are compared with similar liveweight gains of animals fed under feedlot trial
conditions. The SHFS liveweight gain can, therefore, be considered a partial
success if liveweight per se is considered. However, the question of the dressing
percentage of such fattened animals will have to be addressed. In that case, the
critical factor in the fattening operation would be the dressed weight rather than
the liveweight gain. Comparable liveweight gains have been achieved under feedlot
trials over a shorter period but with high inputs of concentrates (see Olayiwole et
al, 1981).
• 23. Liveweight gain in itself may not be a critical consideration for the farmer who has
a profit motive behind fattening livestock. The profit margin of the operation is
the main concern of the farmer. No matter what the gain in liveweight is, it does
not mean much to the farmer if the weight gain is not translated into cash value.
24. In Table 3 the average difference between the pre-fattening and post-fattening values
for a three-month period is N443. This means that the farmer is able to earn about
N 148 a month for every animal fattened. From this value, deductions have to be
made for the costs of other inputs such as all the feeds and mineral supplies,
veterinary drugs, animal handling costs (at purchase and at sale), costs of labour
(hired and domestic hands), interest to be paid on loan and other miscellaneous
expenditure associated with the scheme. Data on these inputs were not available
for this analysis and therefore have not been included in the calculations of the
profit margin. However, assuming that about 50% of the post-fattening value goes
for inputs other than the cost of purchasing the animal, the farmer would be left with
little or no profit. This is because of the high rate of inflation that has accompanied
the massive devaluation of the Nigerian currency1.
25. But using Craig's (1982) estimates, the profit margin over visible costs of inputs (at
highly subsidised rates) cannot be considered attractive enough to encourage
participating farmers to continue in the scheme or to attract new entrants seeking
profit from fattening animals. A profit margin of only N 15 was presumed by Craig
in 1982 (Table 4). With the current prohibitive costs of inputs it can be expected
that the farmer will hardly break even let alone make any profit. The economic
rationale of the scheme is, therefore, not convincing.
26. The foregoing observations on the low economic returns from the SHFS has not
considered the costs of subsidising feed supplies, staff man-hour, veterinary drugs
and supplies, and other logistical costs on the part of the supervising agencies. One
then wonders what the situation would be if all these costs are accounted for and
borne completely by the farmer.
Conclusions
27. The performance of the Smallholder Fattening Scheme under the SI DP can be
clearly seen to be similar to the scheme under the FLDP, considering the
cost-effectiveness of the scheme. Both the FLDP and the SLDP assumed that by
intensifying a commercial tendency of livestock production, the most possible volume
of meat and milk would be made available. The assumption that the level of
income of the rural farmer would be raised through fattening more animals lor the
market has also teen used as pivotal point for various forms of project initiation
in the livestock sub-sector.
28. It can be argued that these assumptions are premised on incorrect information
and/or insufficient knowledge of the project beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of the
SHFS for instance, often consists of persons who are influential in their communities
or those employed in the formal sector and who often have the economic power or
the political clout that would allow them to benefit from the scheme. These people
arc mostly urban-based with little or no link with the rural area.
2(J. The scheme can therefore be seen to be targeted more for the urban/elite than for
rural farmers, as it was intended to be. The net result is the emergence of a
situation of an increased process of accumulation, concentration and differential ion
(Beckman, 1982) in the livestock sub-sector of the Nigerian economy.
30. Considering the costs of running the scheme and the actual results obtained along
with the effects on the protein intake level of Nigerians, the Smallholder Fattening
Scheme cannot be considered anything but an elitist illusion of improved method
of livestock production in Nigeria. Indeed, it may be considered yet anoihci
misdirected government project although with good intentions at the conception
stage.
31. Considering its impact on the level of human nutrition (animal-source protein
intake), no visible positive change in the availability of local meat has been
observed. The lack of increased meat availability may be associated with the
limited number of persons involved in the scheme. The number of participants in
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the SHIS may be too small 10 have any meaningful impact on the supply of more
animal protein.
32. Furthermore, the people that benefitted most from the scheme did not have any
form of livestock background, and therefore, performed much worse than it would
have been if they had some experience in raising livestock. Beneficiaries with
livestock tradition would better cope with animal management routines and
therefore be a better target of the SHFS.
33. It may be concluded, following the foregoing observations, that livestock
development programmes or projects that have a high import content like the FI.DP
and SI DP will continue to weaken the economic base of the sector and further
deepen the dependent development syndrome of the livestock sector. The
accessibility of livestock development funding to community influential and other
political and business elites will further concentrate wealth and power into a few
hands at the detriment of the producing majority.
34. It follows from these observations that the scheme needs serious overhauling if it is
lo meet the stated objectives. The basic point in re-orienting lies in the retargeting
of project beneficiaries away from the urban elite group and to involve the actual
producers of livestock who have the background needed to better utilize additional
inputs that ate provided by government. Without directing efforts at the producers,
livestock production in the area of fattening schemes will continue to suffer serious
setbacks.
35. Finally, a general tendency can be observed in Nigeria's effort at developing the
livestock sub-sector. More often than not, the guiding principle of development has
always been the concern for improvement in the national economic growth
indicators. Planners frequently overemphasize the need to attain a certain level of
economic growth at the exclusion of other socio-economic and cultural enhancement
of the population. In this way the GNP syndrome has been an overriding factor in
the design of livestock development programmes and projects. I ivcslock
development in Nigeria can be seen to tilt more in favour of increased output in
production, in this case measured by increases in the liveweight gains of fattened
animals. This gives little or no consideration to the socio-economic improvement
and welbeing of the people targeted by development interventions, nor are inputs
that have gone into project schemes properly accounted for. The tendency to
emphasise growth indicators is true for most development programmes in other
sectors of the economy.
36. A more fundamental issue arises in the conceptualisation, planning and
implementation of development projects such as the SHFS with both the FLDP and
the SLDP. Development planning in this area has often been based on inadequate
knowledge or at best incomplete knowledge and understanding of the prevailing
situations and conditions in the environment of the planned intervention. Lack of
knowledge is, of course, related to the dearth of dependable structural and
statistical data. This situation often "blinds planners to the negative side effects
which can result from a proposed change and often, in the end, far outweigh the
expected advantages (Carvalho, 1974). As a result of this lack of or inaccurate
information on proposed development target, many development agencies in Nigeria
(and indeed in most other developing countries) have frequently made optimistic
projections of the outcomes of proposed interventions. Such predictions are usually
premised on biased evaluations and are as such void of accurate information or
complete data.
37. It is very clear from the examination of the SHFS above that incomplete data has
been used to make subjective evaluation of the SHFS. The misinformation
occasioned by the use of incomplete data in evaluating the performance of the
scheme became the basis for replicating the scheme and in an expanded fashion.
Adequate monitoring and evaluation work need to be stepped up if reliable and
appropriate information is to be collected for further programme planning. To this
end, project beneficiaries should be compelled to render proper and detail account
of their operations by way of informing project agencies when, for example,
decisions such as sale of animals are being contemplated. Coupled with this. Field
extension contacts with project participants should be increased so that a more
complete situation of the producers is known and documented on a regular basis.
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Table 1. Nigeria's food and animal transaction (1972-1983).
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Source: Compiled from Economic and Statistical
Review, 1979 and 1983.
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Table 2. Smallholder credit scheme: First Livestock Development Project*.




(N) (N) (N) (%)
Anambra 40 790 98 250 85 931 12 319 12.54
Bendel 100 000 400 000 386 000 14 000 3.50
River 32 698 57 595 51 219 6 376 11.07
Kano 100 000 356 000 337 403 18 597 5.22
Niger 332 000 1 520 000 273 264 1 246 736 82.02
Kwara 174 000 165 051 107 193 57 858 35.05
Lagos 20 000 16 560 9 100 7 460 45.04
Ogun 123 431 344 410 265 011 79 399 23.05
Ondo 220 600 285 424 115 869 169 555 59.40
Oyo 383 402 383 402 142 295 241 107 62.90
* Computed figure for states with complete returns.
Source: Compiled from NLPD (1988:6).
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Benue 250 300 50 1 000 1 600
C/River 190 250 60 1 200 1 600
Kaduna 275 400 125 1 200 1 650
Kano 303 n/a n/a 1 294 1 500
Katsina 200 300 100 900 1 500
Niger 265 360 95 720 1 280
Sokoto 285 305 20 1 050 1 540
Kwara 230 320 90 890 1 200
Ondo 230 325 100 800 1 200
Oyo 200 260 60 1 190 1 600
* Source: Recalculated from NLPD Quarterly Report (1988:12).
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Table 4. Target budget for smallholder cattle fattening scheme participants.
Funds available Target
Loan amount (6 months) N l 600.00
Farmen contribution (5%) 90.00
Total available N l 750.1)0
lnputs
4 cattle 275 kg at N 1 39 per kg N 1 529.1K)
24 x 50 kg bags wheat bran at N 6.50 156.00
2 x 200 litre drums molasses at N 24.00 48.00
2 x 10 kg mineral salt block at N 6.00 12.00
8 x 10 gm Thibenzole Boli at N 034 2.00
6 x 2 gm Rnide Boli at N 038 2.28
lnterest: 5% p.a. on N 1 660 (6 months) N 41.50
Total cost N l 791.50
Output
4 cattle at 325 kg at N 1.50 per kg N 2 080.1X)
Less repayment (principal and interest) 1 701.50
Less initial contribution 90.00
Margin over costs* 378.50
* Assuming no increase between purchase and selling prices:
N l 807.00
4 cattle at 325 kg at N 1.39 per kg l 701.50
Less repayment (principal and interest)
Less contribution 90.IX)
Margin over costs N 15.1XJ
Note: Fattening period of 100 days was assumed with average daily liveweight gain of 500
gm per head. Thus 50 kg liveweight increased per head or 200 kg per loan.
No on-farm costs of forage or labour included.
No value in output or manure produced included.
Source: Adapted from Craig (1982:369).
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